In international politics, intergovernmental treaties provide the rules of the game. In this paper, we deal with the rules under which the contents of treaties may be changed, such as rules for adoption and entry into force and rules for dispute resolution. Based on 400 treaties and supplementary agreements from the field of international environmental law, we describe how frequently these rules are used in practice and how they are typically combined. Using correspondence analysis, we show that treaty provisions can be represented in a two-dimensional property space, where treaties are mapped according to the degree of institutionalisation as well as along a flexibility dimension. Using a formal model in the incomplete contracts tradition, we interpret amendment rules as the result of a trade-off between the risk of too little flexibility, which leads to frequent inefficient breach of the treaty, and the danger that the binding nature of the treaty and hence, the level of commitment by treaty members, is being undermined if the treaty can be amended too easily.
Introduction
In international politics, intergovernmental treaties provide the rules of the game. Treaties form the constitutions of international relations between the governments committed to them. Like national constitutions, intergovernmental treaties contain only global goals. They constitute frameworks within which concrete solutions can be embedded. An inherent attribute of constitution-building is to declare a consensus on broader goals and to maintain vagueness in order to allow member states to react flexibly in case of changing circumstances. Therefore, intergovernmental treaties never fully specify all the options open to members up to the implementation of operative policies, but include a degree of flexibility through possible modification and re-interpretation of the treaty.
At the centre of this paper are the procedures by which existing treaties can be amended. While a legal basis for amendment and modification is provided by customary law, as well as by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties adopted in 1972, many treaties contain their own rules by which amendments are facilitated, such as majority decision-making. Moreover, subordinate texts to the treaties such as technical annexes or protocols are often subject to different, and easier, amendment rules. Indeed, numerous institutional innovations have emerged in international law, such as framework conventions which formulate only the common interest of the contracting parties, with concrete obligations being developed (and codified) continuously in further negotiation rounds.
Another way of introducing flexibility into international treaties is to formulate them vaguely, but to allow for binding interpretation by dispute settlement bodies as a way of filling the gaps and opening the door for successive development of the treaty (Cooter, 2000 , Stone Sweet, 1998 , Vanberg, 1998 . The line between treaty development by judicial interpretation and formal amendment is thin. 1 In this paper, we use the existence of dispute settlement procedures as an indicator for the importance of change by interpretation. As Stone Sweet notes, "the implementation of third-party dispute resolution mechanism constitutes one, often privileged mechanism of adapting rule systems to the needs and purpose of live under them" (Stone Sweet, 2000: Preface) . Many of these mechanisms will never actually be applied. Nevertheless, their mere presence may have a strategic impact on actors' behaviour (Chasek, 2001: 237) and it is, therefore, likely that they are chosen consciously. Ex ante, it is unclear whether arbitration provides an alternative to explicit treaty amendment or whether both ways of including flexibility complement each other. Therefore, both should be looked at in conjunction. The possibility of amending or re-interpreting a treaty serves to adjust its contents to changing circumstances. However, the fact that a treaty may be renegotiated in the future 1 "The separation between an ... authentic interpretation and a treaty amendment is sometimes problematic" (Ipsen, 1999: 115 , translation by the authors). For a similar statement, see Amerasinghe (1996: 417) . also gives rise to possible strategic behaviour by governments. In the economic literature, these incentives have been discussed in incomplete contracts literature (for a survey, see Tirole, 1999) . 2 Technically, an incomplete contract does not include all relevant information available at the time when it is concluded. 3 For instance, a treaty may not specify contractual consequences for all future contingencies. The result is that the parties may, at some stage, wish to renegotiate the contract. In reality, international treaties are incomplete contracts for a number of reasons. They often specify the obligations of the member states only vaguely, such that it is difficult to assess whether a state is complying with its treaty obligations. Moreover, no clear consequences are stated for many contingencies.
The main problem with contractual incompleteness is that the possibility of future renegotiation may provide an obstacle for the parties to invest in the contractual relationship, because the gains from investment may be redistributed among parties when the treaty is being amended. The argument rests on the assumption that some decisions made in the expectation that the treaty will be fulfilled are irreversible. We argue that many multilateral agreements, and in particular international environmental treaties, are characterised by the irreversibility of investment decisions.
Provisions for renegotiation of international treaties have been recently discussed by Koremenos (2001a Koremenos ( , 2001b . She is mainly concerned with the choice of treaties with fixed or indefinite duration. In the case of finite duration, renegotiations on the prolongation of the treaty take place. Otherwise, there are no renegotiations. Koremenos introduces costs of renegotiation, such as costs of organising a meeting, opportunity costs from wasting time in negotiations and the like, as a reason why treaties are not always concluded for a fixed duration. However, Koremenos does not deal with the problem of irreversible investments.
In this paper, we first outline basic principles of international law concerning the amendment and interpretation of treaties. In the empirical part of the paper, we investigate how amendment rules and third-party arbitration by tribunals are configured in practice, using a data set of 400 multilateral environmental treaties and supplementary agreements. Similar to Koremenos (2001b) , we measure provisions for treaty amendment and 2 Other important areas of economic contract theory are the principal-and-agent theory, the theory of moral hazard and the theory of incentive-compatible contracts. 3 In the legal literature, the definition of contractual incompleteness is distinct from its use in economics. For lawyers, the crucial point is whether or not the contract contains gaps in its rules, such that the conditions under which the contract obliges the actors to certain actions are not completely specified. "A contract is said to be complete if the list of conditions on which the actions are based is exhaustive, that is, if the contract provides explicitly for all possible conditions. Otherwise, a contract will be referred to as incomplete" (Shavell, 1998:436) . From an economic perspective, by contrast, Pareto optimality is a decisive criterion for complete contracts. Even contracts which specify for each state of the world an action to be taken can be incomplete, if the parties have ex post an incentive to renegotiate the contract.
interpretation. 4 A descriptive analysis shows that there is wide variation in the use of amendment provisions and their combinations applied. Moreover, the joint design of different provisions for flexibility in real treaties seem to reinforce each other. We also note that procedures granting greater flexibility are used less frequently in more recent times. We then introduce a formal model, establishing the basic trade-off between flexibility and commitment to the treaty. It is shown that under certain circumstances, more restrictive provisions for renegotiation such as ratification requirements give parties a reason to rely on the treaty as concluded and, therefore, induce them to make relation-specific investments. On the other hand, they induce more frequent breach. The trade-off depends on a number of parameters such as the number of parties to the treaty and the importance of irreversible investments, which may explain the variety of provisions found in the empirical analysis.
The Legal Analysis of Renegotiation Procedures

Legal sources of amendment rules
In international law, treaties are the central legal basis for the commitment of states.
5
Standard textbooks of international law such as Ipsen (1999) , Bowett (1982) , and Shermers and Blokker (1995) often contain sections on treaty amendment and definitions of the relevant concepts. A starting point are the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. According to Article 39 of the Convention, treaties can be amended by the contracting parties. Unless the treaty provides otherwise, the rules for amendment are the same as the rules for conclusion and entry into force of the original treaty. This means that, apart from treaties adopted at international conferences, amendments are subject to the consent of all contracting parties. In particular, no state can be bound by an amendment to which it has not given its consent (Article 40). The amendment of a treaty has to be distinguished from a modification as stipulated by Article 41 of the Vienna Convention. Modification means the "changing of particular treaty provisions or even of the whole treaty as agreed upon by a subset of the members, thereby defining only the relationships between subsets of members, so called 'inter-se-4 Chasek (2001) also codes amendment procedures as part of her "strength index" but uses only 10 treaties as empirical basis.
For a critical assessment of the role of international treaties in the context of international lawmaking, see Haffner (1999: 132 , translated by the authors): "The explicit formulation of law norms has advantages as well as disadvantages as compared to non-written norms. Advantages, because it systematises and integrates existing law, guaranteeing awareness of the norm better verifiability, which results in the prevention of conflicts. As a consequence, states have larger influence in the ongoing active design of international treaties as compared to international common law. ... Disadvantages of codification arise from the fixation of the law at a given point of time, which prevents the dynamic flexibility necessary for adjustment to new conditions." agreements', whereas 'amendments' designate a changing of the treaty by all its members" (Ipsen, 1999: 136, translated by the authors). There are a number of conditions connected to treaty modifications which do not apply in the case of treaty amendment. In particular, the position of non-members to inter-se agreements must not be called in question. The requirement is that the modification "does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations" (Article 41.1 (b) (i) of the Vienna Convention). Therefore, amendments adopted and ratified by a majority but not all member states (if the treaty allows for it) are to be distinguished from modifications. In reality, however, this distinction may often be unclear (Ipsen, 1999: 136f.) .
With reference to constitutional treaties (i.e. treaties setting up an international organisation or an international regime), Amerasinghe (1996) points out that the application of Article 40 would be particularly problematic if only a subset of the original treaty members declare themselves bound by an amendment: "In the case of a constitution of an international organization, the constitution would be unworkable, if some amended provisions applied as between one group of members, while conflicting amendment provisions applied as between another group of members or as between the two groups" (Amerasinghe, 1996: 410). 6 He resolves this problem as follows:
"Short of concluding that constitutions cannot be amended unless specific provision for their amendment has been made, it may be suggested either that amendment is only possible if all the members agree to the amendment -a principle conferring a veto on very single member -or that, while amendment may be possible by agreement among a simple or other majority, those members who refuse to agree to the amendment either cease to be members or must act as if bound by the amendment" (Amerasinghe, 1996: 411) .
The latter possibility, however, would be incompatible with the consensus principle inherent in the Vienna Convention, since a group of treaty members could confront the minority with a "take it or leave it"-threat not foreseen at the time the original treaty was concluded.
A further distinction is sometimes made between amendment and revision. If only parts of an existing treaty are changed, the term "amendment" is now accepted, whereas the substantial and encompassing change of a treaty is usually termed as a "treaty revision" (Ipsen, 1999: 136) . Nevertheless, since it is difficult in practice to draw a clear line between amendment and revision, the Vienna Convention only uses the term "amendment".
As the development of the treaty by ongoing interpretation is concerned, article 31 of the Vienna Convention refers explicitly to the interpretation of treaties, but is silent as to 6 These difficulties are also reflected in the discussion on "enhanced cooperation" and "flexibility" in European Community Law. the interpretation of treaties by arbitration tribunals or other international institutions. Article 66 (a) provides for two different ways of dispute resolution: arbitration (which requires the consent of the parties) and the invocation of the International Court of Justice. Concerning the application of Part V of the Vienna Convention itself, Article 66 (b) provides for a conciliation commission which may issue a non-binding recommendation for the settlement of disputes between contracting parties. However, there are many more institutional varieties when we look at the provisions of individual treaties. 
Previous work on treaty amendment procedures
If a treaty does not contain explicit procedures for amendment, the provisions of the Vienna Convention provide the rules (Article 40). In this sense, the Convention provides the default rules for treaty amendment. However, as our empirical analysis will show, many multilateral treaties deviate from the rules of the Vienna Convention.
Despite the existence of a series of case studies (Schwelb, 1954 , Zacklin, 1968 , Gold, 1973 , Bowman, 1995 , little work on has been done on which varieties of provisions exist and how frequently they are used. Only Amerasinghe's (1996: 405-423 ) study on constitutional treaties provides a systematic presentation and preliminary typology of amendment provisions and their application. According to Amerasinghe, most international treaties of constitutional character have provisions for their adjustment. Exceptions are the OECD, the International Telecommunications Union, and the NATO (Amerasinghe, 1996: 406) . Some treaties require the investiture of an intergovernmental conference. For instance, the founding treaties of the European Communities require that amendments be adopted by unanimous agreement at an intergovernmental conference, which itself is initiated by a two-thirds majority of member states. 8 Others stipulate less formal different amendment procedures. Overall, the variety of arrangements and combinations of arrangements appears to be large. In a second step, Amerasinghe classifies amendment provisions according to several criteria. One of them is the substance of the amendment. Another is the majority required for the adoption of amendments as well as the provisions for their entry into force (Amerasinghe, 1996: 409) . In this context, he distinguishes between a one-step and a twostep procedure for amendment as well as between the consensus versus the majority principle (Amerasinghe, 1996: 412) : "A 'one step' procedure involves adoption of the amendment by an organ of the institution, normally the plenary organ (general congress), which adoption is sufficient to bring the amendment into effect for all members, nothing further being required. The 'two-step' procedure, by contrast, requires, first, that action be taken within the institution by a vote of adoption of the amendment by an organ, generally the plenary or general congress, and second, that the amendment 7 For an overview cf. Ipsen (1999 , especially para. 27. be ratified or accepted by some or all of the member States, before the amendment comes into effect." (Amerasinghe, 1996: 412) .
The one-step or two-step procedures can be applied to different subjects within the same treaty, for instance for the constitutional and the operative parts of the treaty. Which of the procedures is finally chosen also depends, Amerasinghe (1996: 413f.) argues, on whether the majority principle is employed (see below section 3.2).
Amerasinghe also notes differences in the provisions concerning members dissenting with the amendment. Several treaties stipulate that dissenting members must cease to be members of the treaty as amended. Thus Article 26 of the Covenant of the League of Nations stipulated that "those who dissented from amendments once they came into effect ceased to be members of the League of Nations" (Amerasinghe, 1996: 411) . Alternatively, dissenting members can be allowed to withdraw voluntarily.
Beside the formal change of treaty provisions, Amerasinghe also covers other flexibility devices. One of these is the "variation" of a treaty, which allows international organisations to adapt a treaty short of formal amendment. This is used, for instance, to increase funding to the organisation (Amerasinghe, 1996: 417 ff.) . Another way of introducing flexibility is by changing the interpretation of the treaty: "Interpretation of constitutional text may result in a departure from the natural and ordinary meaning of texts. … There is a point at which developing a text may result in such change that it amounts to amendment rather than interpretation" (1996: 417), or, even stronger, "The distinction between amendment and interpretation, however, becomes blurred, where practice changes the text of a constitution " (1996: 418) . Accordingly, the presence of institutions such as arbitral tribunals or conciliation commissions which structure and institutionalise the process of ongoing interpretation may be as important an indicator for treaty flexibility as the provisions for formal amendment. 9 Amerasinghe also puts forward a hypothesis how flexibility provisions are combined empirically. According to the hypothesis, majority decision-making is correlated with explicit ratification requirements (see table 1 ). The possibility of modifying a treaty by majority rule implies that the original members commit ex ante to be -at least potentiallyforced to accept amendments which have negative externalities on the minority coalition. Since the unanimity status quo ensures each member its full property rights, such a decision entails the risk of a loss of autonomy and self-determination of an actor and therefore a change of regime from a set of actors with full autonomy to a set of actors with reduced and enhanced autonomy, respectively. Under incomplete information and once members have accepted the risk of majority-based renegotiation, members have a preference to make sure that amendments are actually implemented. This implementation occurs formally by 9 For the discretionary power of constitutional courts in situations of conflicts between separated powers and in cases of constitutional interpretation under given amendment procedures, cf. Cooter (2000: 225-234) . ratification, and practically by complying members. Thus, rather than making renegotiation more difficult, a formal ratification requirement may also serve as a device to make sure which contractual obligations (those of the amended treaty or those of the original treaty) apply to each of the parties and commit members to the implementation of the amendments.
Table 1 here
Despite providing interesting and new insights, Amerasinghe's typology and his analytical conclusions are, in our view, preliminary and tentative. In particular, the stages within the process of amendment, such as initiation, adoption, possible ratification by treaty members and, finally, the legal entry into force should be distinguished more systematically, since the overall flexibility of the treaty is jointly determined by the combination of the provisions at all of these stages. Furthermore, the empirical identification of typical combinations of flexibility provisions, such as majority requirements, requirements for entry into force, and the presence of institutions for conciliation and arbitration, is a prerequisite of a positive theory of a flexible adaptive institution-building. 10 Based on a theory-guided compilation of empirical facts, results may show that, contrary to mainstream convictions in international law as well as in international relations theory, there is not necessarily a linear trend of institutionalisation of international law, but the emergence of complex patterns of checks and balances.
The universe of institutional varieties
Which types of provisions determining the flexibility of treaties do we empirically find in the texts of multilateral treaties? In the multilateral environmental treaties we examine more closely in the next section, we may distinguish between the following types of rules:
• Fixing the duration of the treaty influences flexibility because the contracting parties have to become active in order to extend the duration at the expiry of the treaty (Koremenos, 2001a) . At this point, some of the contracting parties may demand changes to the contents of the treaty, threatening not to participate in the prolongation of the treaty if their demands are not met.
• Some treaties are unlimited in duration, but contain explicit dates for revision conferences. Although this does not preclude amendments to be negotiated outside the revision conferences, it makes renegotiation more likely, since some of the obstacles to renegotiation, such as bringing states' representatives to agree to a date and a place for renegotiation, are removed.
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It should be recalled that Amerasinghe deals only with certain aspects of treaty provisions neglecting, for instance, the possibility of adding protocols and annexes, opening the door to exceptions and refinement without touching the overarching objective of the treaty.
• Adoption and entry into force of amendments follow a diversity of rules. The least flexible approach is to require unanimity of adoption and formal ratification by all contracting parties. More flexible rules are majority voting at the adoption stage and less formal procedures for entry into force or the one-step procedure as described by Amerasinghe (1996) .
• Amendment procedures may differ for different parts of the treaty. In particular, protocols, annexes and appendices may contain technical details, such as the use of specific substances, which are likely to be subject to change in the view of new scientific knowledge, while the main treaty text formulates general principles which are intended to govern state relations over a longer period of time. In this case, amendment procedures may foresee greater flexibility for the supplementary texts as compared to the subordinate treaty.
• Treaties differ in the way non-ratifiers of amendments are treated. Two different provisions can be distinguished. First, non-ratifiers remain bound to the original version of the treaty. This is also the procedure contained in the Vienna Convention. Second, there may be provisions such that non-ratifiers cease to be parties to the treaty. The latter provision clearly provides an incentive to accept the amendment as long as the net benefit from being a member of the treaty are still positive.
• Concerning changes to the obligations by interpretation of the treaty, there may be provisions for bodies which arbitrate between contracting parties in case of conflict. In order to provide for non-violent dispute resolution in case of conflicts about the meaning of the original constitution, treaty members can unanimously ex-ante commit to accept the judgement of independent third parties. One may distinguish bodies which can issue binding decisions to the parties to a dispute and those which can only give recommendations.
• In some treaties, there are explicit opt-out provisions allowing countries to be exempt from certain obligations. This may facilitate change. There may also be indirect effects on flexibility by rules on accession to, and withdrawal from, the treaty.
With these types of provisions, treaty-makers have a wide menu of choices how to structure the renegotiation process in order to adjust the treaty to changing circumstances such as new scientific knowledge or modify contractual obligations for subgroups of members if these are hit by exogenous shocks. However, these provisions can also be used in pursuance of other goals. For instance, the ratification requirement may be chosen to delineate exactly which obligations apply to each of the parties, as mentioned above. Arbitration procedures may be used not only to achieve flexibility but also to create institutions which may be valuable in other contexts. Moreover, it is clear that not all combinations of provisions are equally desirable, since some may counteract each other.
For instance, if the majority rule at the adoption stage were combined with a unanimous ratification requirement, this would lead to the adoption of many amendments which are never actually implemented. Distinguishing patterns in the choice of contractual provisions is, therefore, the main object of the following empirical section.
Empirical analysis of flexibility provisions
In this section, we present a descriptive data analysis of flexibility provisions in multilateral environmental treaties. The questions driving the exploratory data analysis are the following:
• What is the proportion of multilateral environmental treaties actually having explicit flexibility provisions? Are there different provisions within treaty systems, such as differences between the main text and treaty annexes? • How is flexibility achieved and which of the institutional variants, such as provisions concerning duration, adoption, ratification, third party conflict resolution, accessibility, are empirically identifiable? • Which combinations are typically used? Which combinations do not occur? Do combinations of provisions for adoption, entry into force and dispute resolution reinforce or counteract each other in the degree of adaptability they provide? Can we detect a latent pattern behind the combination of flexibility provisions? • Are there changes in flexibility over time?
The data set includes a large number multilateral environmental treaties concluded after the Second World War. Since we interpret our findings with a rational actor model, our strategy is to sample "important" environmental treaties containing non-negligible obligations. In judging whether a treaty is important, we rely on expert judgements. The criterion is inclusion of the treaty in the collection of Burhenne (n.d.) . Burhenne groups treaties into a number of subject categories. Since the number of treaties in the Burhenne collection is very large, we restricted the sample to the following subject categories which form the core of international environmental concerns: air; atmosphere, climate and outer space; environmental conservation (general); hazardous substances; natural resources and nature conservation; non renewable resources and mining; seawater quality and pollution; and water quality and pollution. These represent eight of a total of 35 subject categories.
We use all treaties contained in these subject groups from Burhenne's treaty collection, as well as all supplementary agreements such as protocols, annexes or appendices. Clearly, our sample is not meant to be representative for the universe of environmental treaties, let alone for all international agreements. The number of treaty texts in our sample is 400. Of these, all but 35 texts are obtained from internet sources and are thus machine readable. The others are taken from the United Nations Treaty Collection (UNTS) or, in case they are not included there, directly from the Burhenne collection.
An entry in the data set consists of a treaty text or supplementary text which is subject to a certain amendment procedure. This means that texts are not classified according to the provisions they contain, but according to the provisions by which they are affected. Thus, if the amendment procedure of an appendix to a treaty is contained in the main text of the treaty, information is taken from the main text. In 13 cases, parts of a text were subject to a different amendment procedure than other parts of the treaty. In this case, parts with different procedures form separate entries in the data set.
Given that the data base consists of treaties, protocols, annexes and the like, there is a hierarchy of texts. Of all texts, 102 are separate treaties and 298 are supplementary texts to these treaties. We distinguish between (1) main texts, (2) parts of the main text to which different procedures apply, (3) protocols (explicitly named in this way), 12 (4) level 1 supplementary texts (i.e., annexes or appendixes to treaties or protocols) and (5) level 2 supplementary texts (i.e., appendixes to annexes). Supplementary texts may be adopted at the same time or later than the superordinate text. The number of texts in each category of texts can be seen from table 2. The contents analysis of the texts was based on a keyword search of terms relating to flexibility provisions. 13 The passages containing the legal provisions were then classified according to a code book. The code book contains entries on the following aspects: subject category according to Burhenne; year of adoption; original number of contracting parties, if given in the treaty (used as a control variable); definite-term or indefinite-term agreement; revision of the treaty mentioned (yes/no) and length of period until first revision;
The distinction between a main treaty and a protocol is often considered to be arbitrary by international lawyers and has no legal consequences (Ipsen, 1999: 98) . Usually, however, protocols explicitly refer to an already established treaty. They may borrow their amendment provisions from this treaty, which is why we use a separate category for protocols.
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Keywords referring directly to amendments were the following: amendment, modification, alteration, change, revision and its different lexicographical modifications. As keywords referring to arbitration, we used arbitration, tribunal, judicial, mediation, dispute, settlement, conciliation. We also looked in the wider area of flexibility provisions using the keywords contracting out, opt-out, annulment, termination, suspension, renunciation, withdrawal, termination of membership, escape clause, inter-se. We used a coding procedure whereby an international law students coded each case. After an initial instruction period, the coding proved to be reliable and were only checked randomly by the authors.
14 In other parts of the code book, we did not distinguish between revision and amendment, since these terms are often used synonymously.
amendment mentioned (yes/no); procedure for adoption of amendment; procedure for entry into force of amendment; provisions concerning treaty members dissenting with amendment; institutions for arbitration; bindingness of arbitration (yes/no); scope of the arbitration procedure (complete text or parts of the text). The code book is reproduced in the appendix to this paper. Table 2 here
Univariate analysis
With respect to a number of variables collected, we find that the environmental treaties of our sample are quite similar. First, all of the treaties or supplementary texts are, either explicitly or implicitly, unlimited in duration. This is a striking difference of our data base to the one used by Koremenos (2001b) , who finds may treaties are concluded for a fixed period. The explanation is that Koremenos also samples bilateral treaties and treaties concluded earlier than 1945, where these provisions are far more likely to occur. Second, only 11.2 per cent of the texts in our data base specify a date for possible revision in advance. Third, 82.5 per cent of all treaties do not mention the original members of the treaty or limit the treaty to a particular group of countries. Fourth, only 28 texts explicitly mention the position of signatories which do not accept an amendment. In 21 of these cases, a provision is included stipulating that these members must leave the treaty altogether. 15 This confirms our expectation that in public goods treaties exclusion is rarely used as a threat in order to facilitate amendment or to ensure the uniformity of treaty texts. Finally, only 13 texts limit the scope of the arbitration procedures to particular designated parts of the agreement. We, therefore, limit the following investigation to three kinds of provisions where the variation observed in the sample is greatest: the adoption of amendments, their entry into force, and procedures for dispute settlement. Next, we investigate whether supplementary texts deviate in their flexibility provisions from superordinate texts. If supplementary texts only reproduced the governance structure of the main treaty texts, it would be reasonable to limit the empirical analysis to the latter. However, we observe from table 2 that supplementary texts quite frequently contain amendment procedures which differ from the amendment procedures of the superordinate text. This is most evident in the case of protocols, of which more than a third have provisions which differ from those of the main treaty text. Sometimes, however, this reflects the fact that the protocol is, in fact, a new treaty, such as the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty of 1991, which was adopted over thirty years after the original treaty, or the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 15 These are mainly treaties establishing international organisations or regimes, such as the Antarctic Treaty or the Convention on the International Consultative Maritime Organisation. Hence, we find support for Amerasinghe's notion (mentioned earlier) that it is essential for constitutional treaties to ensure that the same treaty applies to all member states. the Ozone Layer. Others, such as the Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources of 1980 are more closely associated to the original treaty. Hence, there is more heterogeneity in this group of texts than in the others.
In our data, we find a huge number of institutional variants concerning flexibility provisions for adoption, entry into force and dispute settlement. 16 There is clearly a tradeoff between preserving the richness of the institutions of the real world, on the one hand, and the need to reduce them to a limited number of ideal typical arrangements in order to discover regularities in their use, on the other. We solve this problem by aggregating the institutional options into the broader categories shown in tables 3 to 5. From the first column of table 3, we observe that a third of all main treaty texts allow for majority decision-making on amendments. In all but nine cases, this means qualified majority voting by majorities of either two-thirds or three-quarters. About one out of four treaties explicitly grants veto power to each member state, with the consensus rule as a softer form of unanimity. Almost forty per cent of treaties do not mention flexibility provisions at all or leave the amendment rule unspecified. Here, the Vienna Convention as a fallback provides the rules for amendment, which means unanimous decision-making.
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As far as the supplementary texts are concerned, supplementary text are generally less restrictive than main treaty texts. According to the chi-squared statistic, the difference between main treaty texts and supplementary texts is highly significant. Also interesting is that supplementary texts more often contain specific amendment procedures than treaties. This is because treaties with an array of supplementary texts are more institutionalised entities than stand-alone treaties, and the degree of institutionalisation carries over to the supplementary texts.
Table 3 here
Concerning provisions for entry into force (table 4), only few multilateral treaties require all parties to ratify amendments. In all other cases, either ratification of a majority of member states is sufficient for entry into force or entry into force of amendments does not require formal ratification. The third row contains those cases where the treaty enters into force automatically unless a specified number or proportion of member states raises 16 In many cases, requirements are quite complex, for instance if a majority is defined both in terms of the number of states as well as in their importance to the problem -such as tonnage for treaties concerning the pollution of the sea. Other treaties, like the Antarctic Treaty, distinguish between different groups of member states with different weights in the decision procedure. Some treaties, especially regional ones, express the majority requirements in absolute numbers rather than proportions. 17 However, in cases of conflict the explicit definition of unanimous renegotiations may result in lower transaction costs as compared to treaties amended in accordance with the Vienna Convention.
objections. Ratification is more often used for main treaty texts and protocols, while automatic entry into force is a provision most often found in supplementary texts. In particular, the simplified procedure whereby an amendment enters into force unless objections are raised almost becomes the norm for level 2 supplementary texts. The fourth row contains cases where the treaty enters into force without further conditions. 18 This corresponds to Amerasinghe's one-step procedure. Overall, only a small fraction of sample texts contain such a provision. Again, the absence of a specification for entry into force means that the provisions of the Vienna Convention apply. As in the previous table, the null hypothesis that flexibility rules are used in the same way for all levels of treaty texts is rejected at a high significance level. Table 4 here
With regard to the provisions for dispute resolution (table 5) , we distinguish between tribunals issuing binding decisions and bodies which give recommendations only. If a treaty contains both kinds of provisions, we code it as having binding arbitration. We observe that more than half of the treaties do not provide for institutions for dispute settlement at all. On the other hand, supplementary texts show significantly more stringent dispute settlement procedures, more than half of them having binding arbitration. 
Bivariate and multivariate analysis
In the following table, we describe the most frequent combinations of flexibility provisions. This gives a first impression on whether provisions in one category, such as adoption provisions, are complemented by provisions in another, i.e. entry into force or arbitration procedures. As an empirical basis, we consider the full sample of 400 treaty and agreement texts.
The most frequently used combination consists in the absence of rules in all three types of provisions we consider. This mainly concerns treaties adopted from the 1950s to the 1970s. In most cases where a majority is sufficient for adoption, we also find provisions for binding arbitration (lines 2, 5 and 8). However, there is also a considerable number of cases where binding arbitration goes together with consensus or the fallback provisions (lines 3, 6 and 15).
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In some cases, the amendment enters into force only for those states which do not object to being bound by the amended treaty. In others, no objections are admissible. Amerasinghe's (1996: 413) conjecture according to which a majority requirement at the adoption stage necessitates a further ratification stage is contradicted by 17 texts which combine qualified majority voting with the one-step procedure (line 8). These cases appear to be particularly interesting because here, a majority of treaty members make decisions which become, without further conditions, binding on all states. However, the one-step category comprises also the possibility that states can individually object to an amendment, with the consequence that the amendment does not become binding on them, but without calling into question the legal entry into force of the amendment. 19 We found only one case among those included in line 8 where such an opt-out provision was not included. 20 The most restrictive amendment procedure from the table is contained in line 12 (unanimity, all members have to ratify, no arbitration).
In the next step, we apply correspondence analysis to describe more completely the combined application of different flexibility provisions. The aim is to recover the dimensionality of the data. We are interested in whether the variety of flexibility provisions and their combinations are reducible to a common underlying property space. Correspondence analysis is an exploratory method for finding out lower-dimensional mappings of discrete data tables (Greenacre, 1993 , Clausen, 1998 , Blasius, 2001 ). The institutional provisions contained in tables 3 to 5 are entered as nominal, rather than ordinal, categories in order to preclude any arrangement of the data that should be the result of the dimension reducing technique. The extracted spaces are defined according to a chi-squared distance concept. We use bivariate correspondence analysis of a composed table. The column variable is the procedure for adoption of amendments, which is regarded as the central variable of interest since it determines whether all parties have given their consent to amendments. The rows are formed by the procedures for entry into force and for arbitration. 21 We display combined biplots, i.e. row and column points are in a single map. Standardisation is symmetrical
22
. It is important to keep in mind that even with a symmetrical standardisation one cannot, in contrast to the use of Euclidean distance metric in factor analysis, exactly interpret distances between row and column points, respectively, as similarities. However, it is possible to draw conclusions from the clustering of variable values, because row points that are close to each other can be interpreted as being similar as compared to the distribution of cases across the columns.
Turning to the results shown in figure 1 , we conclude from the Eigenvalues that two dimensions are sufficient to explain the variation in flexibility provisions. The first and 19 See Appendix.
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Statutes of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (as amended), 1948. 21 This procedure is usually practised following the application in Bourdieu (1984) .
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Standardising only on rows and columns, respectively, led to identical results. second dimensions together explain about 70 per cent of the inertia. While according to a chi-squared test, a third dimension would contribute significantly to the explanation of inertia, we decided to leave it out because it contributes only four percentage points to the total inertia explained.
Figure 1 here
The dimensions of the graph have a clear prima facie interpretation. The xdimension, explaining about 60 per cent of inertia and accounting for about 84 per cent of the total inertia, can be viewed as the degree of explicit institutionalisation. Provisions to the left of the graph are institutionalised options, while the absence of explicit provisions is located at the right. The y-dimension, by contrast, can be interpreted as indicating the degree of flexibility in decision-making.
The institutionalisation dimension extends from the implicit default solution for adoption on one pole (contributing the most to the inertia of this dimension) to the group of explicit provisions on the other. The absence of provisions for adoption or entry into force renders a treaty even less institutionalised than a treaty which does not include a procedure for dispute settlement. The second dimension extends from the requirement that an amendment must be ratified by all treaty members to the majoritarian amendment rules. The result that the requirement for all contracting parties to ratify amendments is ranked as least flexible is not surprising in the light of our ex ante reasoning (see section 2.3). With some distance, the adoption of an amendment by unanimity or by consensus is also identified as a requirement inhibiting flexibility. Binding dispute settlement has the same coordinate in the y-dimension as the majoritarian amendment provisions. Overall, the provisions for arbitration fit remarkably well into the two dimensions. Treaties without amendment procedures have a low degree of institutionalisation, while the bindingness or otherwise of the arbitral judgement determines the position in the flexibility dimension. Binding arbitration may be associated with majoritarian decision-making (i.e., flexible rules) for the reasons discussed above. Alternatively, a tribunal issuing binding judgements contributes on its own to flexibility, since the scope for the development of the contractual obligations is enhanced.
One-step procedures which do not have an independent procedure for coming into force are located at an intermediate degree of flexibility. One might argue that the absence of any ratification stage is the most flexible provision for entry into force. In practice, however, one-step procedures are frequently combined with the consensus requirement at the adoption stage. Here, there could be another dimension at work: both consensus and the one-step procedure could be chosen for treaties which are not particularly important in terms of member states interests and for which, thus, the costs of coming to an agreement are held minimal.
Next, we repeat the analysis for the group of main treaty texts and protocols. The inclusion of all supplementary texts could result in a too high a weight being given to provisions from treaties with many supplementary texts, since in some cases the supplementary texts just reproduce the provisions from the main text. The results from figure 2 show that the coordinates of the provisions show little change compared to the full sample. Somewhat counter-intuitively, however, consensus and unanimity at adoption change places. This may perhaps reflect the reduction of the overall number of observations, rather than structural differences between different groups of treaties.
In a further step, we introduce two groups of passive variables, the year of adoption of the text and the position of text in the hierarchy defined in tables 3 to 5. Passive variables can be located in the same dimensions as the flexibility provision, while they do not influence the coordinates of the active variables (see Clausen 1998 , Blasius 2001 . Figure 3 shows the location of texts at different hierarchy stages in the institutionalisation and flexibility dimensions. The positions of the different flexibility provisions are the same as in the previous figures, with "a" designating an adoption procedure, "e" a procedure for entry into force and "t" a rule on arbitration. We observe that main treaty texts are found to be less institutionalised than supplementary texts. This may be implied by the construction of the data: if a treaty contains amendment procedures, they usually extend to appendixes and annexes, too. More interesting are the differences in the flexibility dimension. If the treaty contains parts subject to different amendment procedures, these articles contain more flexible provisions. Supplementary texts on the first hierarchy level are not different from the main treaty texts with respect to flexibility. However, supplementary texts at the second hierarchy level do possess more flexible provisions. Figure 3 here
Figure 2 here
Taking the year of adoption as a passive variable (figure 4), we note that the degree of institutionalisation has increased over time, albeit this development seems to have come to an end in the 1980s. In the flexibility dimension, there is a marked change between treaties adopted in the 1970s and treaties adopted after 1990. Treaties adopted earlier show a much higher degree of flexibility, being positioned at the same y-coordinate as the majoritarian provisions for adoption and entry into force. By contrast, treaties from the 1990s are positioned at the same flexibility coordinate as the consensus rule. Any model accounting for the choice of flexibility provisions must be able to explain this dramatic change in the choice of rules over time.
Figure 4 here
Summing up, in our interpretation of the data, the different rules on adoption and entry into forces of amendments and arbitration rules are used predominantly to achieve a certain level of flexibility. While it might be conceivable that, as mentioned in the previous section, provisions for arbitration and explicit amendment serve a variety of goals and are, therefore, used independently from each other, there is little evidence for this from multivariate analysis. As a consequence, any theory explaining the choice of amendment or arbitration procedures must start from their effects on treaty flexibility.
A Contract Theoretic Interpretation of Renegotiation Clauses in Multilateral Treaties
This section presents a stylised model providing a normative guideline of which degree of flexibility to choose under varying circumstances. By using the equilibrium of the model as a prediction for the choice of flexibility under different circumstances, we offer an explanation for the change in the degree of flexibility over time. Central to the model is the notion that different renegotiation rules, by influencing costs of recontracting, alter the incentives to keep to the treaty and to invest in the treaty relationship. Therefore, they have important consequences for the amount of benefits member states obtain from the treaty. Central to the model is the notion of irreversibility of decisions taken in the expectation that the treaty will be fulfilled. If there were no irreversibility, renegotiation of an existing treaty would not provide any advantage as compared to burying the old treaty and concluding a completely new one. No specific provisions for renegotiation would be required in this case. In the following, we assume that some sunk investment costs must be incurred individually by the treaty partners before the treaty can become effective.
Empirically, in international environmental law, sunk investment costs are often an important characteristic of the decision problem. An example, mentioned by Raustiala (2001: 480ff) , is the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil of 1954 (OILPOL), superseded in 1973 by the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). The main instrument of the 1954 treaty was to put limits on the discharge of oil by ocean-going tankers. By contrast, the MARPOL convention introduced certain minimum standards on the equipment of tankers, in particular the requirement for segregated ballast tanks such that ballast water should no longer be carried in, and discharged from, cargo oil tanks. The requirement of the OILPOL convention did not necessarily give rise to sunk costs, because it left open how the reduction was to be achieved. By contrast, the provisions of the MARPOL convention require shipowners to equip new tankers with costly new technology. Shipowners cannot recover these costs in case the convention is withdrawn.
In general, international environmental treaties cause sunk costs if they induce polluters to apply new technology in the production process in order to reduce the emission of harmful substances, to change the specification of products or to abandon the production of certain products altogether. Other treaties, such as those restricting maritime fishing activities or limiting the economic exploitation of Antarctica or the moon, regulate the use of a common resource. These treaties influences economic decisions over which capacities to hold. Decisions on capacities -such as a reduction of tonnage in the fishing industry -lead to sunk costs, because new physical capital is built up or old production facilities are dumped.
The model builds on basic features of a problem first studied by Shavell (1980) and extended to the renegotiation case by Rogerson (1984) . We apply this framework to the particular problem of cross-border externalities. While these authors concentrated on the bilateral seller-buyer relationship, we consider the multilateral case where there is perfect symmetry ex ante. Applying this analytical framework to problems in international law, one needs to be specific on what kind of treaty provisions can be enforced. International environmental problems often have the form of a prisoners' dilemma. In the absence of a central supranational authority or a sanction mechanism, it is doubtful whether international treaties can be used to overcome the prisoners' dilemma (see, for instance, Böhringer, Finus and Vogt, 2002) . Therefore, we assume that the treaty is self-enforcing ex ante. All countries expect to derive positive benefits from participating in a given level of activities.
For the same reason, we consider only the case where there are no damages in case of breach of contract. Shavell (1980) studies a situation where there are various legal remedies to breach of contract, such as expectation or reliance damages or specific performance, and compares their effects on efficiency. Rogerson (1984) deals with the specific performance rule, such that a court can order an actor to fulfil the contract. 23 These legal rules are not feasible in international law because of the lack of central enforcement power. Hence, if the treaty is violated and, therefore, fails to become effective, the positions of the parties are as if no treaty had been concluded apart from expenditures made in the expectation that the treaty will be fulfilled. By the same token, we assume that it is not feasible to sign contracts on investment levels, although countries can observe each other's level of investment. In the example of the MARPOL convention, states cannot credibly promise to equip a certain number of tankers with segregated ballast tanks. This is important because it gives rise to incomplete contracts as in the papers of Shavell and Rogerson. 23 This is also a precondition to certain contractual solutions to the so called hold-up problem, such as the contract types studied by Hart and Moore (1988) , Aghion et al. (1994) and Nöldecke and Schmidt (1995).
While we do not assume that international law is strong enough to make states fulfil their contractual obligations when it is not in their interests, we do assume that renegotiation design is binding. If the case of renegotiation arises, the rules included in the treaty for this case will structure the bargaining game. There will be no bargaining on the rules themselves. Whether international law is strong enough to induce this sort of commitment may be doubted. International lawyers, however, distinguish between procedural compliance and substantive compliance. 24 If the latter can be better observed than the former, it may be achieved more easily. Disregarding agreed rules that are considered as fair may be prohibitively costly in terms of states' reputation. Clearly, if commitment was not possible, renegotiation clauses in international treaties would be meaningless. Since they are contained in many treaties, this suggests that commitment to them must, at least partially, be ensured.
A further important assumption in the following is that no party can commit not to renegotiate. This assumption introduces a hold-up problem as in the studies by Grout (1984) , Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) , Williamson (1985) and many others. Consequently, if any party can improve their position by renegotiating in accordance with the rules laid down in the treaty, the other parties will not be able to credibly turn down an offer to renegotiate when faced with the threat that the treaty will not be fulfilled.
In one of the situations we study in the following, renegotiations are costless. Due to the lack of enforcement, the outcome foreseen in the original treaty has no special status in this case. Consequently, the parties always base their decisions on the anticipated outcome from renegotiations. 25 The other situations are situations where renegotiations are infinitely costly and situations where there is a positive but limited cost to renegotiations. Costs to renegotiation provide importance to the original treaty because it may be in the interest of parties to avoid these costs even if some of the parties would prefer a different treaty.
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Costs of renegotiation are central to our paper because the actual renegotiation provisions studied in the empirical part imply different levels of costs, such as costs of information, direct costs of attending negotiations, costs due to the involvement of various domestic actors and others. Most obviously, a provision whereby amendments have to be ratified by the parties causes higher costs of renegotiation vis-à-vis the situation where no 24 See, for instance, Brown Weiss (1995).
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In principle, aribtral tribunals could be used to enforce the original treaty. However, this would be viable only if arbitration was compulsory. In international law, both parties must ex post agree to be bound by the tribunal's verdict. Therefore, enforcement remains completely voluntary even in the presence of arbitral tribunals. Tribunals, however, may substitute for renegotiation and are thus a way of lowering renegotiation costs. ratification is required. The application of the model to the renegotiation rules found in actual treaties is discussed further below.
In the following, we compare the situations with no enforcement and no renegotiation to each other and to the Pareto optimum. We will then study the situation where there are positive but finite costs of renegotiation.
The model
Let N be a given set of parties to the treaty. Parties are identical in all respects at the time of treaty conclusion. The treaty deals with the production of an excludable collective good. Production is a zero-one decision, i.e. the volume of the collective good is not a choice variable. We assume that the good needs the participation of all parties in order to be produced. Hence, if at least one party chooses to leave the treaty, no party will be able to benefit from the good. The model could be generalised to allow for some benefits if participation remains below N. However, the additional degree of realism would considerably add to the complexity of the model. All parties are assumed to be risk-neutral and have the following utility functions (dropping the subscripts for countries):
the treaty is performed ( ) if the treaty is renegotiated if the treaty is breached
Y H p r r U Y H p r b r Y r
where Y is income, H is the benefit from the treaty, p is a contribution to be paid, b are costs of renegotiation, and r is an investment influencing the amount of income that must be spent in fulfilment of the treaty. Investments are sunk, so they cannot be recovered should the treaty fail to be applied. They influence only the utility of the party investing. The latter assumption is made because if investments had spill-over effects to other parties, this would give rise to a collective action problem which would substantially complicate the discussion. The contribution p can consist, for instance, in costly reduction in abatement levels. With the investment variable, we model the fact that there are often different ways to comply with treaties. For instance, to comply with the MARPOL convention, separate ballast tanks can be built into tankers. Alternatively, the tanker fleet may simply be kept in the ports. The latter option may be more expensive than the former in terms of foregone income, but using the former, the country risks making an investment which does not pay off (if other nations do not keep to the treaty).
We assume that there are decreasing returns to investment and the investment function is concave:
Moreover, we consider the net value function in the following:
V r H p r = − (using the same notation as Shavell, 1980, and Rogerson, 1984) V r r − eventually reaches a global maximum, so there is an optimal value of r i if the party can be sure that the treaty is fulfilled.
Figure 5 here
The complete sequence of events is described in figure 5 . The treaty concluded at t 1 stipulates that the collective good will be produced and parties pay a contribution p fixed in the treaty at time t 6 . Since all parties are in the same position at the time of treaty conclusion, the contribution will be assumed to be equal for all parties without explicitly specifying how an agreement on p is made. If the good is not produced, the parties will not have to pay their contributions.
At time t 2 , each party incurs sunk investment costs r influencing the net benefit from the treaty. At time t 3 , a contingency ε hits one of the parties. The distribution of ε is given by a symmetric and single-peaked density function ε Ex ante, the probability that each party is hit is the same for all parties. It simplifies the analysis immensely if we assume that the shock hits only one of the parties. After the shock has occurred, three outcomes are possible. First, contributions are made as foreseen in the treaty and the good is produced. Second, the treaty is renegotiated. In our context, this means that the parties renegotiate over contributions or transfer payments to redistribute ex-post utility. Third, the treaty may fail to be fulfilled. If at least one party does not contribute, the good will not be produced and all parties will realise a utility from the treaty of i r − . In this latter case, there are no damages to be paid by any party. The fall-back position in renegotiations is, therefore, always the case where the good is not produced and all parties lose their individual investments r.
Since the default solution is the "no trade" outcome, there is a danger of underinvestment in this model. This stands in contrast to the problem of excess reliance studied by Shavell and Rogerson, where there are legal remedies for breach of contract. The danger arises because the investment is not contracted on. In the example at the beginning of this section, states cannot promise to equip a given number of tankers with segregated ballast tanks. If the treaty provides insufficient incentives to invest, states or individual shipowners will choose to reduce their tanker fleets instead of investing. This, in turn, gives them insufficient incentives to keep to the treaty when adverse contingencies reduce the country's benefit from the treaty.
Pareto-optimal breach and investment
We first characterise the Pareto optimum with respect to the optimal fulfilment (or breach) of the treaty and the optimal investment decisions. The optimum can easily be derived from the sum of social benefits and costs. The optimal breach decision implies that the good is produced if there is a net social benefit from it. The optimal breach set (Shavell, 1980) , i,e, the set of ε such that the contract is not performed in optimum, is therefore
Optimal investment, given optimal termination of the contract, can be derived by maximising the sum of benefits and costs:
The first-order conditions for this problem are
implying that each party invests equal amounts:
and optimal investment determined by ( )
where the * denotes the Pareto-optimal solution.
Infinitely costly renegotiations
We now consider now the case where, due to a lack of communication between the parties, no renegotiations can take place. Since there is strategic interaction in the choice of investment levels, a solution concept for the resulting game is required. In our case, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is the solution concept and backwards induction is used to find the equilibrium. At stage t 6 , each party chooses individually whether to keep or break the treaty, given the investments made earlier. Under the assumptions of the model, parties not affected by the shock receive a positive net utility and always keep to the treaty. The party receiving the shock, in the following denoted as party i, keeps to the treaty only if the benefits including shock ε are positive. The breach set is then
It is obvious that the treaty will be breached more often than in the Pareto optimum. This is because a party hit by a shock neglects the benefits from the treaty for the other parties in its breach decisions, i.e. it neglects a positive externality. To determine investment expenditures, the expected utility of each party must be maximised:
The first-order conditions determine optimal investments for party i given investments of all other parties:
Optimal investment of party i depends on the investment decisions made by all other parties to the treaty. At t 2 , levels of investment are chosen simultaneously. The first-order conditions (3) form a set of reaction functions which jointly give optimal investment. Given the symmetry of the model ex ante, one may combine the reaction functions using , i j r r r i j = = ∀ , yielding:
Comparing (4) with (2) and recalling the diminishing returns in V(r), one notes that investment is smaller than in the case of no renegotiations: ˆ* r r < . Hence, the solution of the no-renegotiation game is not Pareto-optimal both with respect to the breach as well as the reliance decision.
4.4Renegotiations with zero costs
If there is the possibility of renegotiation, we need to specify what each party receives in case of renegotiations. For the time being, we assume that an amendment to the treaty requires unanimity. Since parties are not differentiated, we will assume that each party has the same bargaining power in the renegotiation game. Then, the surplus will be shared so that each party receives 1/N of the common surplus:
When will renegotiations occur? Since parties cannot commit not to renegotiate, a sufficient condition for renegotiations to occur is that at least one party is better off in the renegotiated outcome than under the original treaty. It follows that, unless 0 ε = , the treaty will always be amended through renegotiations, even if the original treaty would be performed in the absence of renegotiations.
Equation (5), by allocating each party the same share of the common surplus, implies that the breach decision coincides with the Pareto-optimal rule. Expected payoffs are ( )
Maximisation of this expression over r i and combining the N first-order conditions leads to the following condition for investment:
Proposition 1: Under costless renegotiations (i) the breach decision follows the Paretooptimal rule (ii) investments are lower than in the Pareto optimal case (iii) investments are lower than in the case without renegotiations.
Result (ii), the well-known hold-up problem, is established by comparison of (2) and (4). Result (iii) is obtained by dividing (4) by (6) . No renegotiations will lead to higher investments ( ≥ % r r ) under the following condition:
Since the density function is symmetric around zero and N>2, condition (7) holds with necessity. The opposite case (r r ≥ % ) would lead to the reversed inequality in (7), which cannot be true for any values of r and r% . Hence, the disincentive to invest brought about by the hold-up problem dominates the disincentive to invest due to inefficient breach. Judging the relative efficiency of the two cases, however, the investment disincentive must be set against the advantage of increased flexibility, which reduces ex post inefficient breach. Which of these Pareto-dominates depends on the shape of the net value function ( ) V r . The more elastic it is with respect to r, the more important the aspect of investment becomes and the less beneficial renegotiations are. The proposition by Jolls (1997) that no renegotiation is optimal is, therefore, not supported unambiguously by the model.
Renegotiations with positive but finite costs
In the following, we assume that cost of b units must be borne by all members of the treaty in case of renegotiation. This case is an intermediary case to costless and infinitely costly renegotiation. A difference is, however, that in the intermediary case, some renegotiation costs arise. This fact prevents the outcome from simply being a linear combination of the two polar cases discussed earlier.
Proposition 2: (i) Higher costs of renegotiation induce more inefficient breach. (ii) There is an upper limit for b beyond which an increase in renegotiation costs always is a Pareto improvement. (iii) Below this limit, higher costs of renegotiation increase investment if the number of parties to the treaty is large but may decrease investment for a small number of parties.
The proof of parts (ii) and (iii) of the proposition can be found in the appendix. The intuition for result (ii) is that, from a certain level of costs, breach would occur more often under renegotiations than under the original treaty. Therefore, there are no renegotiations in this area. Therefore, renegotiations occur only if ε is low. Since there is no effect of renegotiations on breach, they can only diminish the incentive to invest. Hence, it is preferable if renegotiations are impossible.
From result (iii), the intuition that positive but finite costs of renegotiation provide incentives intermediate between the cases of zero and infinite costs is confirmed for a high number of participants. In the appendix, it is shown that if the number of participants exceeds five, the effect of costs on investment is always positive. Below that level, the likelihood of being hit by the shock is relatively large. This exacerbates incentives to underinvest arising from the fact that the likelihood of bearing a high ε alone (without renegotiations) increases with the level of investment. These disincentive effects can be shown to be proportional to b. In these cases, lowering renegotiation costs is always a Pareto improvement. For a high number of participants, however, the model shows that renegotiation rules may help to manage the trade-off between hold-up and inefficient breach.
Whether this increases ex ante utility for governments is not clear if b is are pure welfare cost. To include them in the decision problem and solve for the optimal b, one would need a more specific model. The opposite case, where b is not a welfare cost and does not have to be considered in the choice of Pareto-optimal renegotiation rules, may arise if b is a transfer payment made to a third party in the case of renegotiation (see Schwartz and Watson, 2003) . However, payments promised to third parties require a treaty. It may not be incentive-compatible to keep to this treaty, and it is hard to see how the promise could be enforced.
Costs of majority and unanimity rules
The argument made this far has shown that costs of renegotiation can be used to create incentives to invest in the treaty relationship. In some situations, both breach and investment will be improved if renegotiation costs are lowered from a positive but finite level. In other cases, the optimum is found where renegotiations are prohibitively costly. The decision depends on the parameters of the particular case. But how can costs of renegotiation be influenced in the real world?
An institution which influences b is the ratification requirement. Putting minor amendments in international treaties on the agenda of all parliaments of the signatory states clearly is the procedure causing the highest level of administrative costs. By contrast, if amendments can enter into force if no party objects, this leads to much lower costs of renegotiation. At the adoption stage, a consensus requirement causes lower costs of renegotiation than unanimity, because in the latter case, all parties must become active in some way, e.g. by sending diplomats to a meeting. Arbitration rules save costs of renegotiation because the decision is delegated to a body consisting only of a small body of individuals.
Another choice which matters in this respect is between majority and unanimity rule. Majority rule has two effects: Benefits will be concentrated on the members of a winning coalition and negotiation costs can be saved if it can be assumed that majorities form before all delegates convene to negotiate over renegotiations (countries do not send delegates to meetings, abstain from decision-making, etc.).
According to figure 5, parties decide in t 4 whether to accept the original proposal or to renegotiate. What is the expected utility from renegotiation at this stage? We assume that coalitions have not yet formed at this stage, hence each party must calculate with the probability of being in a winning coalition. Suppose that the majority requirement is S. Then the probability of being in a minimum winning coalition is simply S/N. A coalition will distribute all benefits to its members. The expected payoff from renegotiation is ( )
Comparing (8) with (5), these conditions are equivalent if = % b Nb S . Therefore, if renegotiation costs are incurred only by the majority, every majority requirement S/N can be translated into changes in renegotiation costs b. If renegotiation costs are incurred by all parties, regardless of whether they are in the winning coalition, nothing changes as compared to the case of unanimity and the conditions for breach and investment are exactly the same as before. All of these institutions have the same impact in the model, namely to shift the cost parameter b. Therefore, it is not surprising that they can be ranked in a single dimension, as correspondence analysis implies. The choice of amendment provisions and, hence, costs of renegotiation is motivated by the importance of sunk investment costs. The more important this aspect, the less flexibility a treaty should provide in order to maximise investments. The most restrictive amendment procedure (unanimity, all members have to ratify, no arbitration) applies to the following three treaties, including their supplementary texts: the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora of 1964, the Agreement for Cooperation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil and Other Harmful Substances of 1983 and the Cooperation Agreement for the Protection of the Coasts and Waters of the North-East Atlantic Against Pollution of 1990. According to our theory, these should be treaties where sunk costs are particularly important. While this is not obvious in the first case, the other two treaties do contain provision which require member states to undertake irreversible investments. The Agreement of 1983 call on states to set up techniques to monitor oil pollution. The Cooperation Agreement of 1990 requires states to set up and maintain in operation equipment in order to be able to deal with discharges of hydrocarbons or other harmful substances. These investments lose much of their value if treaties fail to be effective.
There is also an interpretation for the use of more costly procedures in later years, found from figure 4. Given that environmental treaties adopted later contain more substantive and less symbolic content (Congleton, 1992) , this finding accords well with our theory. In our view, the more restrictive rules contained in the treaties of the 1990s serve to protect the irreversible decisions required by the treaties adopted during this decade, while negotiators had to be less apprehensive concerning the dangers of renegotiation in earlier periods since decisions could more easily be reversed. In this interpretation, procedures such as consensus decision-making were chosen not to prevent parties negatively affected by majority decision-making from leaving the treaty. This would not be in line with our contract theoretic interpretation since costly procedures entail more, not less inefficient breach. Rather, consensus served as a safeguard to prevent exploitation of parties relying on the treaty by less committed parties.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have analysed flexibility provisions in multilateral environmental treaties and described their application in real world settings. Coming from a contract theory perspective, we have stressed that the flexibility provisions included in international treaties have economic significance. The advantage of additional flexibility is that treaties can more easily be adapted to changes in preferences or new scientific knowledge. The disadvantage is that, by introducing majority rules for amendment and the like, countries risk the loss of their irreversible investments into the treaty relationship. Therefore, they may be reluctant to enter large-scale international commitments. The optimal amendment rule weighs advantages and disadvantages of additional flexibility in a way that ex-ante utility of the treaty is maximised. It depends directly on the degree to which the investment into the contractual relationship is reversible.
Clearly, there are important aspects not included in the model. For instance, we have assumed that actors are risk-neutral. If, by contrast, actors' preferences imply risk-aversion, the choice of consensus instead of majority rule could also be motivated by the desire to protect against collective decisions contrary to one's interests. Integrating these aspects into a more general model could be an interesting task for further research.
In our exploratory empirical analysis, we have looked at 400 multilateral treaties and supplementary texts from the area of international environmental politics. We note that there are remarkable differences in the provisions for adoption and entry into force of amendments, as well as in the existence and use of third-party arbitration. Using correspondence analysis, we show that the provisions can be represented in two dimensions: one is the degree of explicit institutionalisation, the other is the degree of flexibility in collective decision making. Furthermore, it is shown that flexibility rules complement each other. Treaties which have more flexible amendment rules are also more likely to have binding arbitration procedures.
Our empirical results mainly serve to establish some quantitative knowledge on flexibility rules, which has so far not been established in the literature, while a precise statistical test of our economic hypotheses must be left to further research. Another avenue for further research could be to extend the universe of treaties investigated. Restricting the analysis to treaties dealing with a particular subject-matter, environmental problems, left us with considerable variation in some provisions for renegotiation. However, treaties were quite similar in other respects, such as the duration or the provisions concerning members not ratifying amendments. Our guess is that this may have to do with the economic character of the good provided by the treaty. Techniques such as loglinear modelling or hierarchical logistic regression models (Thurner, 1998 (Thurner, , 2000 ii Multiple entries are possible during the coding procedure, for the aggregation only the arbitration procedure with the highest degree of institutionalisation is considered.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2
Since the equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash, we consider the breach decision first. The object is to find the parameter regions under which (a) the treaty will be breached, (b) the treaty will be renegotiated, or (c) the treaty will be fulfilled as originally negotiated. First, consider the condition for breach. Suppose that ε > ( ) i i V r so that the unamended treaty cannot be fulfilled. Then a sufficient condition for renegotiation is that the social benefit from the renegotiated treaty is positive net of renegotiation costs. The breach set under costly negotiations is, therefore,
Comparing the breach set with the Pareto optimal one, any b>0 will result in inefficient breach.
Under which condition will the treaty be renegotiated if the original treaty could be fulfilled due to ε < ( ) i i V r ? The treaty will be renegotiated if
If there is a positive benefit from renegotiation for at least one party, fulfilment of the original treaty is a weakly dominated strategy. Therefore, renegotiations will start. From this condition, the area where no renegotiations take place is within the interval
Outside this interval, there will be renegotiations given that (9) is fulfilled. There are two cases to consider: ( ) ( )
Nb provides the upper bound for
, then no renegotiations take place in this area, because the area where renegotiations do not pay borders the breach area.
, the areas where renegotiations take place or breach occurs, given a value for ε, look as follows: Hence, if ε>0, there will be no renegotiations.
To prove parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 2, we consider the incentive to invest. Consider first case 2: here it is optimal to let b go to infinity because renegotiations do not decrease the breach set. At the same time, they reduce investments due to renegotiations for the case that ε < −Nb . The first-order conditions for case 2 ensure that all parties choose the same levels of investment. They combine to ( ) The first two terms give marginal utility of investment in case of renegotiation, the second term represents marginal utility from application of the original treaty. Clearly, r will be smaller in comparison to (4). Hence, starting from a high level of renegotiation costs, renegotiations should be made prohibitively expensive. This proves part (ii) of Proposition 2. Now consider case 1: Taking the first order conditions, simplifying terms and solving for the unique investment level compatible with Nash equilibrium gives the following condition for optimal investment:
The second, fourth and fifth terms represent the marginal utilities from investment for the intervals in which renegotiation and the original treaty are chosen. The first and the third term arise due to the impact of investment on the borders of the intervals themselves. For instance, if party i invests more, it is less likely to demand renegotiation if hit by an adverse shock. This increases the expected value of the shock, providing a disincentive to invest. We note that (11) approaches (6) as b goes to zero. Do renegotiation costs increase or decrease investment in case 1? Clearly, positive renegotiation costs can only be optimal of they lead to increases in investment, because at the same time they decrease efficient fulfilment. From, the implicit function theorem, the sign of dr/db in the Nash equilibrium is the same as the sign of the partial derivative of (11) with respect to b. We find the latter to be This expression cannot be signed unambiguously. The first three terms, taken together, are positive, the fifth is negative and the fourth may be either positive or negative depending on whether N>3. The first two terms represent the effect of higher b decreasing the renegotiation area to the left of the distribution. The last term is the effect of higher b causing more inefficient breach and, hence, less investment. The terms from the middle of the distribution depend crucially on the number of participants. For instance, if the distribution of ε is completely flat, the derivative is positive for N>5 and negative otherwise. As the distribution becomes more steeply sloped, the negative terms become relatively smaller and the requirement for a minimum number of participants to make the derivative positive is relaxed. This proves part (iii) of Proposition 2. 
